In tests using the same fraction of packets for comparison, packet sampling outperformed flow sampling for scan detection, while both selective sampling and a proposed extension that uses significantly less resources were superior to either of these techniques.
T raffic monitoring and analysis is essential to cybersecurity, yet the growing list of applications and the worldwide increase in cybercrime have made it increasingly difficult to understand what is happening in a network. 1 The common practice of taking data samples instead of capturing full packets exacerbates the problem in highspeed links. Network operators tend to apply aggressive sampling rates when using monitoring tools like NetFlow, 2 which might take one out of 1,000 samples to handle worst-case scenarios and network cyberattacks. Robustness against traffic sampling is of paramount importance because cyberthreat-detection mechanisms must be resilient to sampling to effectively protect the network against a scanning attack.
How scan detection algorithms perform under sampling is a critical aspect of this protection. Network scanning is often the harbinger of other cyberthreats such as worm propagation and, according to a recent study, scanning activities represent more than 80 percent of Internet cyberattacks. 3 Moreover, scans can pose serious threats to monitoring platforms because this kind of cyberthreat can generate a large set of new flows that might easily overwhelm flow tables.
Researchers have proposed several scan detection methods. The straightforward approach, which both Snort 4 and Bro IDS 5 implement, flags a scanner when it connects to more than a certain number of destinations during a fixed time interval. Threshold random walk (TRW) 6 and time-based access pattern sequential (TAPS) 7 hypothesis testing implement more complex scan detection. The main idea in TRW is that a scanner will fail more connections than a benign host, so a host that makes too many failed connections is considered illegitimate. In TAPS, the key idea is that scanners visit far more destination IPs relative to ports than normal hosts with a horizontal scan, or more ports than destination IPs if the scan is vertical. TAPS reports a host generating such flows as a scanner.
Studies to evaluate the effectiveness of scan detection methods have concluded that flow sampling is the best technique for anomaly detection under sampling 8 and that packet sampling performed poorly. 9 After reviewing these results, however, we found that methods differed significantly in the fraction of analyzed packets for the same flow sampling rate, yet these studies use the same percentage of sampled flows as the common metric in their comparison. The "Fallacies in Comparing Sampling Rates" sidebar explains the difficulty in comparing sampling methods using a single metric.
In light of these results, we set out to independently validate the effectiveness of packet sampling relative to flow sampling using a fixed fraction of packets as the common metric instead of flows. Our analysis of the impact of sampling on TRW and TAPS under four sampling techniques revealed that packet sampling outperforms flow sampling for the same fraction of packets. Moreover, selective sampling, which targets small flows normally used to perform scanning cyberattacks, exhibited the best overall performance among the evaluated sampling algorithms.
With this technique's results in mind, we developed a new method, online selective sampling, which works on a per-packet basis and therefore can operate online. It is significantly faster than selective sampling and consumes up to 40 percent less memory.
METHODOLOGY
We applied four sampling techniques-packet, flow, smart, 10 and selective
11
-to four traffic traces obtained using our university's Gigabit Access. The Gigabit link connects 10 campuses, 25 faculties, and 40 departments to the Internet through the Spanish NREN (RedIRIS). Table 1 shows these traces and their collection times. All four datasets were 60-minute traces collected in 2012.
Establishing a ground truth
To ensure the validity of our results, we first created a superset of scanners, [7] [8] [9] running TRW, TAPS, Snort, and Bro with loose parameters. We then used frequent itemset mining and manual inspection to further check that all these scanners were indeed malicious cyberattacks. 3 The frequent item-set mining technique extracts knowledge from data by finding frequent correlations among elements. It is useful for anomaly detection because when an attack takes place, many traffic features with the same values are apparent across numerous traffic flows. For example, when a vertical scan occurs, the technique easily identifies all the flows with the same source and destination IPs.
The final list of scanners became our ground truth against which we compared the scanners detected after applying sampling. Although we cannot guarantee that every scanner in our ground truth is an actual scanner, the frequent item-set mining technique, which automatically finds common patterns, increases the probability that our ground truth is indeed reliable because it significantly reduces errors from human intervention.
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Sampling techniques and metrics
In our study, we abbreviated the four techniques as PS (packet sampling), FS (flow sampling), SMS (smart sampling), 10 and SES 11 (selective sampling). PS samples each Table A shows a sample from our study that illustrates the seriousness of this discrepancy from sampled flows to sampled packets. The percentages in the table are for taken packets and flows, with 10 percent sampling of both flows and packets.
Using only a flow-based metric gives flows an unfair advantage because most sampled network flows are small, containing few packets. Thus, the probability of sampling more than one packet per flow is highly unlikely. Taking 10 percent of all sampled packets levels the playing field, and from the packet-based view, yields quite different results.
Previous work reported the superiority of flow sampling in scan detection, but in light of the variations in Table A , an alternative analysis using the same fraction of packets might provide a different perspective and help researchers better understand the behavior of scan detection algorithms under sampling. packet randomly with probability p, where 0 ≤ p < 1. FS samples each flow, also with a random probability p. SMS preferentially samples large flows over small ones, defining "large" as a flow that exceeds a given size parameter z. The probability of taking smaller flows is inversely proportional to the flow size.
In contrast, SES focuses on sampling small flows, which are typical in the launch of scanning cyberattacks.
11 SES uses three parameters: z corresponds to the threshold that defines the size of a small flow (in packets), c is the probability of sampling a small flow, and n further regulates the percentage of nonsmall flows taken.
We configured TRW and TAPS with a
• false positive ratio of 0.01, • 0.99 probability of detection, • 0.2 probability that a successful connection comes from a scanner, and • 0.8 probability that a successful connection comes from a legitimate host. 6, 7 To obtain the optimal results, we configured the ratio that TAPS uses to detect suspicious sources (k) and the time bin to check it (t) differently for each traffic trace and sampling rate. 8, 9 For Snort, we used the sfPortscan detection module with the scan type set to all and a low sense level, which ensures low false positives. For Bro's standard scan detection algorithm, we used an alarm threshold of 25.
Our performance analysis relied on two metrics. 7 The success ratio (SR) is the number of true scanners detected divided by the number of true scanners, the latter being the scanners defined in our ground truth scanner list. The false positive ratio (FPR) is the number of false scanners detected divided by the number of true scanners. This metric indicates an algorithm's correctness by reporting the percentage of sources wrongly classified as scanners.
SAMPLING AND SCAN DETECTION
Only a few efforts have focused on analyzing how sampling affects TRW and TAPS. 8, 9, 12 One analysis showed that for TRW both false positives and false negatives increased significantly with sampling. 9 This study also showed that TAPS is more resilient to sampling than TRW because TAPS exhibited a significantly lower ratio of false positives.
An extension of that analysis showed that packet sampling introduces an important bias in flow-size distribution and that techniques targeting large flows are not efficient in scan detection because these cyberattacks use small flows. 8 The extended study concluded that flow sampling was the best choice for scan detection under sampling, and that packet sampling was among the worst choices. This result was disheartening for network security, since routers implement only packet-based sampling techniques.
A preliminary study of packet sampling's performance using the same fraction of packets showed that it could outperform flow sampling in some scenarios. 12 To offer additional insights into how sampling affects scan detection, we analyzed the impact of the four sampling techniques on TRW and TAPS using the same fraction of packets. The figure shows some significant trends. TRW can detect only 20 percent of the scanners in the ground truth when there is no sampling, which underlines the idea that the algorithm, not the sampling, is primarily responsible for TRW's low performance. Sampling does, however, further degrade TRW's accuracy. 8, 9 Except for SES, sampling severely decreases SR; under SMS, SR reaches zero with more than 75 percent of the packets sampled. One reason might be flow size: TRW tracks single SYN-packet flows to spot scanners, and SMS samples large flows, so it keeps flows that are useless for TRW.
Impact on TRW
For PS and FS, SR degrades linearly for increasing sampling rates (s) even though PS is slightly better than FS. Although previous work reported that packet sampling is worse than flow sampling in scan detection, 8 our results show that the final conclusion depends on the metric used to compare these methods. For SES, SR is equal to the unsampled case and is even higher for s up to approximately 1 percent. Moreover, for lower sampling rates, SES can still detect some scanners. TRW performs well under SES because this sampling method focuses on small flows, which are precisely the flows that TRW looks for to find scanners. SES outperforms the unsampled case because it drops nonsmall flows and therefore leads TRW to a biased scenario in which most of the hosts generate only single SYNpacket flows.
For FPR, all sampling techniques report low false positives. PS is the worst performer, with the peak of approximately 3.2 percent occurring with 25 percent of the packets. This poor level is due to the flow-shortening effect, 8, 9 which transforms multipacket flows into single packet flows and thus leads to the wrong classification of many hosts.
Similarly, SES presents an unrealistic scenario in which most of the hosts generate only single SYN-packet flows. However, SES maintains a lower FPR for all sampling rates, with a maximum close to 2 percent. Both FS and SMS show almost no false positives because the former keeps the flow-size distribution and the latter leads mainly to false negatives (low SR), but not to false positives because it systematically drops small flows. On average, TAPS can detect only 57.47 percent of the scanners in the ground truth when there is no sampling. Although the detection rate is far higher than with TRW, this highlights the importance of combining mechanisms to detect a broader range of cyberthreats-in our case, using Snort, Bro, TRW, and TAPS. The performance degradation among sampling methods is similar to TRW's. Specifically, SES offers the best success ratio followed by PS, FS, and, finally, SMS. Similar to the TRW case, the sampling methods focusing on small flows perform better than those that take large flows with higher probability.
Impact on TAPS
As with TRW, PS reports higher SR than FS, which does not align with previous work. 8 Similar to what we observed for TRW, TAPS also has a low false positive rate.
Implications
Clearly, sampling severely affects both TRW and TAPS performance, although TAPS can detect more scanners primarily because it does not depend on any specific packet. TRW tracks single SYN-packet flows, but TAPS is more concerned with the host's access pattern than with what packet is taken. Consequently, TRW is more sensitive to the particular packet being discarded. Moreover, while TAPS detects both UDP and TCP scans, TRW only detects TCP scans. Although TAPS systematically reports higher SR, TRW shows slightly better FPR. Overall, with sampling, TAPS is preferable to TRW. 9 Our results imply two conclusions about sampling techniques. First, unlike previous reports, 8, 9 PS shows better results than FS when using the same fraction of packets for both TRW and TAPS. Second, SES clearly outperforms the other sampling techniques primarily because of its restriction to small flows, which many cyberthreats such as scans use to perform attacks. Therefore, keeping small flows rather than large ones makes it easier to identify anomalous traffic.
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ONLINE SELECTIVE SAMPLING
Although SES outperforms the other sampling techniques, it must capture all the packets and then sample entire flows, requiring the storage of all incoming flows in memory until they expire. This scheme is contradictory to the main goal of traffic sampling, which is to save resources by discarding part of the traffic.
To address this drawback, we developed online selective sampling (OSES), which targets the same type of traffic but does not need to capture entire flows because it makes per-packet decisions, which require fewer resources and can thus work online.
Determining what to sample
SES preferentially samples small flows (defined by a packet threshold) and disregards large flows. OSES, in contrast, maintains a flow by sampling all its packets while it is small. If we define a small flow as an x-packet flow (with x ≥ 1), OSES will sample all flows having at most x packets with a certain (high) probability and take all the flows having x + 1 packets or more with lower probability-the more packets, the higher the probability of discarding the flow.
A straightforward solution first stores all flows in a hash table and then has a certain probability of removing them from the table as they expire. 11 However, this solution requires significant memory and is not fast enough in high-speed links. In particular, the interarrival times in links of several gigabytes per second are on the order of nanoseconds, thus requiring the process time per packet to be incredibly fast.
In contrast, our solution uses Bloom filters because of their extremely quick lookup time and low memory requirements. A flow remains in the hash table until OSES discards it instead of waiting until the flow finishes or expires, as in SES.
OSES does not capture entire flows, so it cannot know the flow's final size to decide whether or not to sample it. It knows a flow's size only up to its current packet. Because our goal is to make OSES performance equivalent to that of selective sampling but without capturing all the traffic, the probability of taking a flow packet by packet should be exactly the same as it would be when sampling the entire flow. For that reason, we must adjust OSES's probability p at each step (for every packet) so that the accumulated probability until the last packet is the same as it would be if we directly sampled that flow with SES. In particular, the per-packet decisions must compensate for the higher number of random decisions taken relative to the single decision that SES requires.
Computing sampling probabilities
For each incoming packet, OSES checks if the corresponding 5-tuple of the flow is set in the Bloom filter. If it is, OSES drops the packet because its presence in the filter means that OSES has previously discarded that flow. If it is not in the filter, OSES processes the new packet as follows.
First, OSES checks that the adjusted probability p is not lower than a certain random probability; otherwise, it will drop the new packet, delete its flow from the hash table, and set its 5-tuple in the Bloom filter. If p is higher than the random probability, OSES will sample the packet.
OSES uses an accumulation of random and independent decisions to compute sampling probability. If . (3) The probability function of SES 11 is 
The next step is to compute the probability that OSES will sample the ith packet (r i oses ). To satisfy Equation 1 when x is 1, p x oses must equal r i oses , which must equal c.
For multiple packets (x > 1), from Equations 3, 4, and 5, the individual probability of sampling a flow's ith packet is 
Performance comparison
In our study, OSES-sampled traffic is similar to the traffic that SES sampled. We configured the Bloom filter with m = 2 18 (we used a power of 2 to satisfy implementation
The per-packet decisions must compensate for the higher number of random decisions taken relative to the single decision that SES requires.
constraints). We empirically observed a negligible number of false positives (<< 1 percent of the incoming packets). We compared the percentage of sampled flows and packets, the average flow size, and the flow-size distribution for OSES and SES. The average and the standard deviation for several executions on dataset-1 for c = 0.9, z = 2, n = 1 resulted in 76.53 percent ± 0.01 of sampled flows, 11.98 percent ± 0.005 of sampled packets, and an average flow size of 1.68 ± 8.94 × 10 −4 packets for OSES. SES showed almost identical results: 76.54 percent ± 0.01 sampled flows, 11.99 percent ± 0.01 packets, and an average of 1.68 ± 0.001 packets per flow. Table 2 shows comparative flow-size distributions that are almost identical. The negligible differences between SES and OSES are due mostly to the need for random decisions. The table shows the percentage of flows only from one-to six-packet sizes, since the remaining flow sizes account for less than 2 percent of the total flows. Figure 3 shows the resource consumption differences between OSES and SES on dataset-1. For execution time, the difference is (t oses -t ses )/t ses , where t is the execution time. Similarly, for memory usage, the percentage is (m osesm ses )/m ses , where m is the maximum memory used.
Resource consumption
A positive percentage indicates that OSES was worse than SES; a negative value implies that OSES outperformed SES. As Figure 3 shows, OSES was superior to SES in both execution time and memory usage. For low sampling rates, OSES used almost 40 percent less memory than SES when the Bloom filter did a quick drop of a large number of packets. OSES was approximately 15 percent faster in that case for the same reason.
As the sampling rate increases, the differences between both methods decrease, but OSES still yields significantly better results. As the percentage of sampled flows gets closer to 100 percent, the Bloom filter's overhead in both runtime and memory becomes visible to the point that OSES is slightly worse than SES, but only for more than 99.8 percent of sampled flows. I n contrast to previous studies, our work demonstrates that, when treated fairly, packet sampling performs better than flow sampling for scan detection. Our results in comparing OSES with SES show that OSES met our twofold objective: to continue capturing scanners reliably under sampling and to use fewer resources than SES. Moreover, SES is not compatible with NetFlow because it is a flow-based sampling mechanism. OSES, in contrast, can work online in most routers because, like NetFlow, it works on a per-packet basis.
On the basis of our analysis, we plan to work on modifying and adapting the scan detection algorithms to make them aware of sampling and, therefore, to improve their accuracy when only a fraction of the traffic is available. We also plan to evaluate and validate our results in a larger network. 
